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IntroductIon
Many of the industrial capitals of America have shrunk from their historic 
prominence to become sparsely populated, depressed, and abandoned. Detroit, with 
its recent controversial Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing,1 the largest municipal bank-
ruptcy filing in American history, is a prime example of a “shrinking city.”2 Its popu-
lation dropped from nearly two million in 1950 to around seven hundred thousand 
in 2010.3 In the last decade alone, it has experienced a 25% population decline.4 It 
      
    
     
     1.  Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles Into Insol-
vency, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-
bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print.
     2.  With its debt at the time of filing totaling approximately $20 billion, Detroit has both 
a larger population and higher debt than the two largest cities to file for municipal bankruptcy 
to date—Jefferson County, Alabama and Stockton, California. Matt Helms, Nancy Kaffer & 
Stephen Henderson, Detroit Files for Bankruptcy, Setting Off Battles with Creditors, Pensions, 
Unions, Detroit Free Press (July 19, 2013, 7:47 AM), www.freep.com/article/20130718/
NEWS01/307180107.
     3.  Michigan – Race and Hispanic Origin for Selected Large Cities and Other Places: 
Earliest Census to 1990, U.S. CenSUS BUreaU (July 13, 2005), http://www.census.gov/popu-
lation/www/documentation/twps0076/MItab.pdf (containing population statistics for 1970); 
State & County QuickFacts: Detroit (City), Michigan, U.S. CenSUS BUreaU,  http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2010, 10:58 AM) (containing pop-
ulation statistics for 2010). 
     4.  Katharine Q. Seelye, Detroit Census Confirms a Desertion Like No Other, n.Y. TimeS, 
Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23detroit.html.
has the additional challenge of being an incredibly segregated metropolitan area, 
stemming largely from the riots of 1967.5 Many white residents fled to the suburbs 
while black residents largely stayed within the city limits, where neighborhoods 
have fallen into sharp decline.6 In the midst of Detroit’s continuing struggle with 
its declining population and extreme segregation, proposals have arisen involving 
condemnations of sparsely populated areas to create more densely populated cen-
ters.7 Such plans would involve the use of the government’s eminent domain power, 
given by the Fifth Amendment and applied to federal, state, and local governments.8 
Although already anticipating legal challenges to any municipal action, the 
city and several economic development initiatives maintain that relocation is the 
only way to solve the city’s population problem.9 The city has in the past put money 
into the neighborhoods that need it the most in an attempt to revive them, but many 
agree now that shrinking the city is the only way to save it.10 Even before Detroit’s 
bankruptcy filing, economic development plans in Detroit had begun to come to 
terms with the city’s shrinking population and now proceed with a smaller Detroit 
in mind.11 This Note will focus on the role that eminent domain will play in the 
enactment of such relocation and downsizing initiatives. The recent history of emi-
nent domain challenges in the United States has focused largely on whether takings 
are motivated by a public use or public purpose.12 Public use is a requirement for 
takings under the Fifth Amendment,13 and most takings challenges are based on the 
argument that the motive was not a public use.14
An additional and central element of public use challenges to eminent do-
main exercises is blight. The ideas of “blight” and “slums” became salient during 
the New Deal era as governments attempted to revitalize and reshape urban areas 
     
     5.  See Coleman a. YoUng & lonnie Wheeler, hard STUff: The aUToBiographY of 
Coleman YoUng 179 (1994); ThomaS J. SUgrUe, The originS of The UrBan CriSiS: raCe and 
ineqUaliTY in poSTWar deTroiT (1996).
     6.  See, e.g., SUgrUe, supra note 5.
     7.  See, e.g., Christine MacDonald, Bing: I’ll Move Some Residents, deTroiT neWS, Feb. 
25, 2010, at A4.
     8.  U.S. ConST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”).
     9.  See MacDonald, supra note 7.
     10.  See id. Mayor Bing is quoted as saying, “If we don’t do it . . . this whole city is going 
to go down. I’m hopeful people will understand that.” Id.
     11.  For a discussion of proposed uses for vacant land and plans to centralize neighbor-
hoods, see The deTroiT WorkS proJeCT, deTroiT fUTUre CiTY: deTroiT STraTegiC frameWork 
plan 172–295 (2012), http://detroitworksproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/The-DFC-
Plan.pdf.
     12.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 
467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
     13.  U.S. ConST. amend. V.
     14.  E.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496.
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and remedy what urban planners saw as a “social liability” based on the social 
problems, crime, and disease associated with slums.15 The Supreme Court has held 
blight eradication to be a valid exercise of eminent domain.16 In the last fifty years, 
the Supreme Court has upheld takings that involve the transfer of private property 
to other private individuals or corporations, accepting the rationale that such trans-
fers promote the goals of blight eradication and economic development.17 However, 
scholars and judges alike have noted that “economic development” takings that tar-
get blighted areas fall disproportionately on poor, uneducated, and minority home-
owners.18 From 1949 to 1963, 63% of families displaced by urban renewal projects 
were “nonwhite” and of those displaced, 56% of nonwhites and 38% of whites had 
low enough income to qualify for public housing.19 Indeed, in the City of Detroit, 
where the population was 82% black in 2010, it is unquestionable that any eco-
nomic development takings would fall more heavily on blacks than on whites.20
This raises the question of the availability of challenges for discrimination 
based on race. Legally, an equal protection challenge will only be sustained if there 
is proof that the state acted with a discriminatory intent; evidence of a discrimina-
tory effect alone is insufficient.21 Though disparate impact may sometimes serve as 
proof of a discriminatory intent, in eminent domain cases evidence of blight will 
almost always represent a strong enough state interest to satisfy strict scrutiny.22 
However, although the takings themselves may be justified by the interest in eco-
nomic development, relocation and redevelopment could be guided by restrictions 
which put into place an affirmative-action-based plan to ensure that displaced mi-
nority residents are resettled into integrated areas with good schools, affordable but 
satisfactory housing, and diverse populations in terms of race and socioeconomic 
status. A plan like this would further the government’s interest in promoting racial 
and ethnic diversity, held to be permissible in the context of both higher and lower 
education so long as the program is narrowly tailored to achieve this end.23 The 
remedial effect of an affirmative-action-based resettlement program would miti-
gate the discriminatory effects of economic development takings, and the combined 
     15.  Edward G. Imperatore, Discriminatory Condemnations and the Fair Housing Act, 96 
geo. l.J. 1027, 1030–31 (2008).
     16.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 26.  
     17.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
     18.  See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing several studies and 
articles on this disproportionate effect).
     19.  Bernard J. frieden & lYnne B. SagalYn, doWnToWn, inC.: hoW ameriCa reBUildS 
CiTieS 28 (1989).
     20.  Compare Detroit’s high proportion of black residents with Michigan’s mere 14%. 
State & County QuickFacts: Detroit (City), Michigan, supra note 3. 
     21.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
     22.  See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954).
     23.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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taking and resettlement would achieve the dual goals of economic revitalization 
of blighted areas and population diversity. By making efforts to resettle displaced 
homeowners in a deliberate fashion, the city would make a great leap towards a 
more permanent alleviation of its segregation problem, providing more stability for 
the city’s future after a long and bitter history of racial tension.24 
The central argument of this Note is that government takings for the pur-
poses of economic development and blight eradication that fall heavily on minority 
populations should be allowed for their economic benefit so long as they are care-
fully tailored to improve racial diversity in the outcome. In spite of their dispropor-
tionate impact on poor, uneducated, and minority homeowners, takings for blight 
eradication should not be restricted in cities like Detroit, where eminent domain is 
a useful and necessary tool for state and municipal governments to overcome the 
effects of declining industries and flight from the cities. Rather, eminent domain 
and subsequent urban development tactics should be used in a race-conscious way 
to promote racial and economic diversity in traditionally segregated urban centers, 
which is a permissible goal under the affirmative action jurisprudence of the Su-
preme Court.25 
Part I of this Note will outline a brief history of recent eminent domain 
jurisprudence, as well as a history of de facto racial segregation in Detroit. Part II 
will highlight some of the existing remedies and other proposed solutions to limit 
economic development takings and discuss their shortcomings as applied to this 
situation. Part III will argue that the reasoning from the Supreme Court’s affirma-
tive action cases should be applied to post-condemnation redevelopment projects in 
order to remedy the disparate impact of such takings on minorities. This Note will 
briefly conclude by reviewing the proposed structure and functionality of a success-
ful redevelopment and reintegration program.
I. HIstory of tHe doctrIne 
            A. Recent History of Economic Development Takings in the United States
A recent line of cases illustrate the Supreme Court’s practice of extreme def-
erence to legislative findings of blight and the need for the use of eminent domain for 
economic development purposes. However, in reality, this economic development 
often involves invoking the eminent domain power to take private property from 
homeowners and transfer it to another private entity, which is known as a “public-
private” taking because the government assigns property taken for a public use to 
a private recipient.26 The Court’s broad interpretation of public purpose allows this 
     24.  For more information on Detroit’s history of racial tension, see generally SUgrUe, 
supra note 5.
     25.  See discussion infra Part I.C.
     26.  See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument 
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type of transfer because any private development can be said to serve the public pur-
pose of bettering the community’s aesthetic appeal or overall economic well-being. 
The first case establishing broad judicial deference to a public-private tak-
ing was Berman v. Parker.27 In that case, the City of Washington, D.C. condemned 
private property pursuant to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, 
and several homeowners sought to enjoin the condemnation.28 The Court held that 
it was within the discretion of the legislature to take into account aesthetic consid-
erations and public health when exercising its eminent domain power.29 Congress’ 
power over the affairs of the District of Columbia is what is traditionally known as 
the police power, and the Court held that “[t]he role of the judiciary in determining 
whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow 
one.”30 Therefore, the Court set the precedent of deferring to what the legislature 
determines to be a public purpose, as the legislature is better set up to make those 
determinations based on legislative findings and extensive studies.31
The Court affirmed Berman in 1984 in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mid-
kiff.32 The Midkiff case involved Hawaii’s Land Reform Act of 1967, which was 
enacted by the state legislature for the purpose of reducing the concentration of 
land ownership in Hawaii, where land had been concentrated in the hands of a few 
land oligarchs for centuries.33 The Land Reform Act allowed the Hawaii Housing 
Authority, after a petition by lessees and public hearings on whether it would serve 
the public purposes of the Act, to condemn single-family residential lots on larger 
tracts of land and sell the land titles to applicant lessees in order to break up the 
land monopoly.34 
In determining whether a public use or purpose was served, the Supreme 
Court began by noting that the statute “unambiguously provides” that the condem-
nation power is for a public use and purpose.35 The Court then followed its rea-
soning in Berman, holding that the state legislature, as the representative of its 
constituents, was constitutionally justified in channeling the will of the Hawaiian 
people,36 and that “[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic 
exercise of a State’s police powers.”37 Once it upheld the legislative judgment that a 
public purpose was served, the Court found that the scheme put in place by the Act 
for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 harv. J.l. & pUB. pol’Y 491, 493–94 (2006).
     27.  348 U.S. 26 (1954).
     28.  Id. at 28.
     29.  Id. at 32–33.
     30.  Id. at 32.
     31.  Id. at 33.
     32.  467 U.S. 229 (1984).
     33.  Id. at 232–34.
     34.  Id. at 233–34.
     35.  Id. at 236.
     36.  Id. at 239–44 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
     37.  Id. at 242.
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was constitutional because it was rationally related to serving that end.38
The most recent and controversial case where the Court again affirmed and 
expanded on the public use concept in Berman and Midkiff was Kelo v. City of New 
London.39 The City of New London, Connecticut, condemned several homes in a 
waterfront area where the New London Development Corporation had proposed 
developing a new “urban village” that included businesses, a conference hotel, res-
taurants, shopping, public walkways, a state park, new residences, and a renovated 
marina.40 Several homeowners whose properties were in the development area sued 
to enjoin the project,41 claiming that economic development did not qualify as a 
public use under the Fifth Amendment and arguing that the Court should require 
a “reasonable certainty” that the projected public benefits would actually accrue.42 
Significantly, the Court noted that there was “no allegation that any of these proper-
ties [were] blighted or otherwise in poor condition; rather, they were condemned 
only because they happen[ed] to be located in the development area.”43 The Court 
followed Berman and Midkiff in holding that the city’s “determination that the area 
was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled 
to our deference.”44 
These three cases represent the Court’s progression toward an ever-broaden-
ing definition of what serves as public use, by expanding the requirement to “public 
purpose” and by deferring to the legislatures on any proposal that might be rationally 
related to serving any purported benefit to the public. There are two ways for courts 
to interpret the phrase “public use” in the Fifth Amendment. A narrow interpretation 
holds that public use means “for use by the public.” Under a narrow interpretation, 
a taking is for “public use” only if the public actually has the right to use the land 
or if it is owned by the government, such as public parks and roads.45 Under the 
broad view, public use is anything that enhances the public welfare, more accurately 
described as “public purpose” than “public use.”46 The broad view is almost univer-
sally accepted in American jurisprudence and allows land taken for a “public pur-
pose” to be transferred to private individuals or corporations so long as there is some 
demonstrable benefit to the public welfare.47 In many cases, the benefit to be accrued 
need not actually be proved by any empirical data, as courts will generally defer to 
legislative allegations of a future benefit.48 In the aforementioned line of cases, the 
     38.  Id.
     39.  545 U.S. 469 (2005).
     40.  Id. at 474.
     41.  Id. at 475.
     42.  Id. at 487.
     43.  Id. at 475.
     44.  Id. at 483.
     45.  See Cohen, supra note 26.
     46.  Id. at 494.
     47.  Id.
     48.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 499 (2005). The Court emphasized 
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Supreme Court firmly established its reliance on a broad view of “public use” and 
increasingly expanded what it considered to be acceptable rationales and public ben-
efits to justify economic development takings.49 While this progression was occur-
ring at the Supreme Court level, the Michigan Supreme Court demonstrated a new 
level of deference to the Michigan legislature in its own highly controversial case.
B. Michigan Eminent Domain Jurisprudence
The most infamous economic development takings case in Michigan, and 
possibly throughout the nation, was Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of De-
troit.50 A neighborhood association and several individual residents of the Poletown 
neighborhood brought suit against the city after it announced it would condemn 
the entire neighborhood to allow General Motors to build a new plant.51 The city 
argued that the jobs the plant would allegedly create constituted a public purpose 
that would benefit the city.52 The Michigan Supreme Court was incredibly defer-
ential, accepting potential, unproven job creation as a legislative rationale for forc-
ing an entire neighborhood of private homeowners to sell their private property.53 
Vigorous criticisms of this decision include the fact that there was no showing of 
blight in the area and, unlike the neighborhood in Berman, there was no showing 
that there were aesthetic or health benefits to be gained by condemning the land for 
private development.54 The only public need to be served was boosting a somewhat 
strained economy.55
In fact, following the condemnation of the Poletown neighborhood and the 
erection of the new General Motors plant, the actual number of jobs created fell far 
that “[b]ecause courts are ill equipped to evaluate the efficacy of proposed legislative initia-
tives, we rejected as unworkable the idea of courts deciding on what is and is not a governmen-
tal function and . . . invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that question at the 
moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields.” Id. (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
     49.  For example, in Kelo, Justice O’Connor asserted in her dissent that “the Court today 
significantly expands the meaning of public use. It holds that the sovereign may take private 
property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so 
long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public . . . . Thus, 
if . . . . predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side effects are enough to render transfer from 
one private party to another constitutional, then the words ‘for public use’ do not realistically 
exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.” Id. at 
501.
     50.  304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 
765 (Mich. 2004). 
     51.  Id. at 457.
     52.  Id. at 458.
     53.  Id. at 459.
     54.  James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 miCh. ST. l. rev. 859, 860.
     55.  Id.
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short of that estimated by the legislature in approving the taking.56 The Michigan 
Supreme Court in Poletown, followed by numerous Michigan Court of Appeals 
cases, emphasized that its holding did not even require the new owner of the land 
to proceed with the project that was used to justify condemnation.57 The entire 
neighborhood was displaced and the only real beneficiary of the taking was General 
Motors. This was hardly the widespread economic benefit promised by the city in 
its justification for the condemnation action.
Poletown set the precedent for extreme judicial deference in economic de-
velopment cases and reinforced the trend toward using a broad, rather than a narrow, 
interpretation of public use. Though a Michigan case, it set influential precedent 
for state and federal courts until it was overruled in 2004.58 This broad interpreta-
tion also meant that courts declined to apply heightened scrutiny when land was 
condemned for transfer to a private entity.59 Any purported economic benefit was 
deemed sufficient to justify a taking and subsequent transfer to private hands, with 
little to no showing of proof that anyone apart from the private recipient would 
benefit from the transfer.
When the Michigan Supreme Court overruled Poletown,60 it left many opti-
mistic that the state supreme court had finally taken a turn towards a narrower inter-
pretation of public purpose.61 In County of Wayne v. Hathcock, the court found that 
the proposed condemnation did not meet the public purpose requirement when the 
county sought to improve and expand Detroit Metropolitan Airport, which would 
have required the condemnation of nineteen parcels of private land directly south 
of the airport.62 The Federal Aviation Administration had begun a project to abate 
noise complaints around airports by purchasing neighboring properties through 
voluntary sales.63 The county eventually acquired approximately 500 acres of non-
     
     56.  Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic De-
velopment Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 miCh. ST. l. rev. 1005, 1012. For 
background information on the resistance from the community, see Jeanie WYlie, poleToWn: 
CommUniTY BeTraYed (1989).
     57.  Somin, supra note 56. 
     58.  See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005); City of Jamestown 
v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 327–73 (N.D. 1996); City of Toledo v. Kim’s 
Auto & Truck Serv., Inc., No. L–02–1318, 2003 WL 22390102, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 
2003).
     59.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 962 P.2d 543 
(Kan. 1998) (approving condemnation of private property for an automobile race track as part 
of development of a tourist area); Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 
662 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002) (approving condemnation of 
an automobile dealership for transfer of the land to Best Buy). 
     60.  Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
     61.  See, e.g., Krier & Serkin, supra note 54, at 860.
     62.  Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
     63.  Id.
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adjacent properties south of the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, and sought to acquire 
the remaining properties through the eminent domain power, proposing to put the 
land to use for the construction of a large business and technology park.64 The court 
found that this proposed public use fell short of the constitutional requirement, 
striking down the condemnation and overruling its infamous Poletown decision.65
Scholars celebrated the Hathcock decision as a move toward a narrower 
interpretation of public use and greater judicial scrutiny of economic development 
takings.66 Though the tentative, large-scale condemnation plans in the City of De-
troit are expected to provoke legal backlash,67 the ensuing legal battle would not 
be a true test of Hathcock’s influence over judicial interpretation of economic de-
velopment takings in that the proposal does not, as of yet, involve a transfer to a 
private beneficiary.68 At the very least, Hathcock’s holding means that the Michigan 
Supreme Court has become more sensitive to public use challenges and can be 
expected to scrutinize economic development takings more carefully in the future. 
C. Affirmative Action
This section will provide a brief overview of the case law on affirmative 
action programs. In general, the Supreme Court has allowed states to implement 
affirmative action programs for two reasons: to remedy past discrimination by the 
state or society, and to achieve diversity in public schools.69 However, the Court has 
made clear that such programs must be incredibly specific both in terms of the goals 
to be attained and in terms of the discrimination to be remedied. Rigid tailoring 
requirements and the prohibition on the use of race quotas provide an impressive 
challenge for states and state agencies seeking to engage in affirmative action.
i. Achieving Diversity in Schools
One of the permissible ends for which states may implement affirmative 
action programs is that of achieving diversity in schools.70 This rule applies in 
     64.  Id.
     65.  Id.
     66.  See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and 
Urban Development After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 miCh. ST. l. rev. 837, 839.
     67.  See MacDonald, supra note 7.
     68.  City officials have not yet made statements about what would be done with the con-
demned land. Rather, the mayor is currently focusing on facilitating the flow of residents from 
distressed neighborhoods into more heavily populated, well-serviced areas. See, e.g., Cecil 
Angel, To Survive, Detroit Must Prune Its Weakest Limbs, deTroiT free preSS, May 22, 2012, 
at A9.
     69.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
     70.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722–25 (2007).
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all public schools, both in lower71 and higher education.72 In Gratz v. Bollinger, 
the Supreme Court further distinguished between acceptable and unacceptable 
means of attaining diversity.73  Programs whereby universities set racial quotas are 
impermissible,74 whereas affirmative action programs, such as the University of 
Michigan’s program in Grutter, that take racial and ethnic diversity into account as 
one of the many factors considered by an admissions board, but also consider life 
experiences, grades, and other qualifications, are permissible.75 
The Parents Involved case is the leading case in the realm of lower educa-
tion, in which the Seattle public school system had attempted to achieve diversity 
by busing minority students to schools outside of their district.76 The Court found 
diversity to be a compelling government interest, but ultimately overturned its deci-
sion because it found that the program was not narrowly tailored enough to its end; 
the city could have achieved diversity through other means and the program was 
only minimally effective towards achieving that end.77 Following Parents Involved, 
schools may use racial balancing strategies only if there is no other way to achieve 
diversity without blatant classification based on race.78 
ii. Remedying Past Discrimination
The second type of affirmative action attempts to remedy past discrimina-
tion by state or private actors by offering benefits to an identified class of people 
against whom such discrimination was directed. It is more difficult for this type 
of program than a diversity program to meet judicial scrutiny.79 Affirmative action 
may only be used to remedy identified discrimination if the provider of the benefit, 
rather than society generally, discriminated against the group in a way that has been 
proven by findings in court, by the legislature, or by an agency with legislative man-
date.80 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,81 the respondent, a white 
     71.  See id.
     72.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
     73.      539 U.S. 244, 270–71 (2003). 
     74.  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315–20 (1978).
     75.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (referencing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313–14).
     76.  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711–14.
     77.  Id. at 722–24.
     78.  Id. at 735. The majority noted, “This working backward to achieve a particular type of 
racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity 
that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent.” Id. at 729.
     79.  See, e.g., Jared M. Mellott, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employ-
ment After Grutter: The Case for Containment, 48 Wm. & marY l. rev. 1091, 2006 (noting that 
while Grutter v. Bollinger greatly expanded diversity affirmative action programs, programs 
based on remedying past discrimination still meet with very stringent judicial scrutiny).
     80.  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
     81.  438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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male, sued for admission to the Medical School of the University of California at 
Davis, claiming that he was denied equal protection when the admissions board 
had admitted a minority student in his place in an attempt to fill an illegitimate race 
quota.82 The Court held that although the University of California was allowed to 
use race as a factor in admissions when the university had discriminated against 
African Americans in the past, the use of racial quotas to achieve its remedial goal 
was impermissible and not narrowly tailored enough to meet the permissible end.83
Remedial affirmative action programs have been attempted in contexts out-
side of higher education, but still meet with difficulty when challenged in court. 
For example, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the city council of Richmond, 
Virginia created a program requiring contractors receiving jobs from the city to set 
aside a certain percentage of their subcontracting jobs for minority subcontractors.84 
In the past, only a slight fraction of jobs had been given to minority subcontractors, 
despite the city being made up of 50% blacks.85 The Court held that cities may enact 
programs to remedy the effects of past discrimination against a certain group, but 
the program was struck down in this case because the city itself had not discrimi-
nated; it was attempting to remedy past discrimination by private contractors who 
refused to hire minority subcontractors.86 Had the city itself created the disparity, as 
had the University of California in Bakke,87 it would be allowed to enact a program 
that was narrowly tailored to remedy the hiring discrepancy.
iii. Recent Affirmative Action Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court recently issued its opinion in the Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin case, in which the Court crystallized its prior decisions on affirma-
tive action programs, essentially boiling all the jurisprudence down to the tailoring 
requirement.88 The Court upheld its decisions in Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter,89 which 
stand for the proposition that all affirmative action programs should be subjected 
to strict scrutiny, and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit with instructions to 
examine closely whether the University of Texas had proven that its program was 
“narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity.”90 The case was 
received with mixed reactions, leaving the general public unclear as to whether or 
not it raised the constitutional bar for universities attempting to justify affirmative 
     82.  Id. at 276–78.
     83.  Id. at 316–317.
     84.  488 U.S. at 477.
     85.  Id. at 479–80.
     86.  Id. at 480, 498.
     87.  Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
     88.  133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
     89.  Id. at 2412.
     90.  Id. at 2421.
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action programs.91 
Justice Ginsburg dissented in Fisher, disagreeing both with the Court’s de-
cision to remand the case and with the more general belief that race-neutral mea-
sures should be used to increase racial diversity.92 She urged the Court that candor 
was preferable to camouflage whenever government actors attempt to remedy overt 
past discrimination.93 For now, however, universities must continue to veil their at-
tempts to increase diversity in elaborate disguises.94
For the purposes of this Note, the Fisher decision will be taken as merely 
reinforcing the tailoring requirement for affirmative action programs. Though it is 
clear that more affirmative action jurisprudence is on its way, this Note will rely on 
the doctrine as it currently stands, post-Fisher.
II. current remedIes and ProPosed solutIons to dIscrImInatory takIngs 
A. Constitutional Challenges
There are multiple ways eminent domain plaintiffs challenge discriminatory 
takings under the U.S. Constitution. Since the problem involves racial discrimina-
tion, one option is to challenge a taking under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.95 Alternatively, affected property owners could claim that 
their due process is violated by the taking.96 These types of challenges have not yet 
been made successfully, but some scholars propose them as a way to block takings 
whose primary effect falls on minorities.97
Another way to challenge a taking is under the Fifth Amendment, which 
provides a remedy (just compensation) and also a requirement (public use).98 Most 
eminent domain challenges are based on the public use requirement and claim 
that the taking was not motivated by a valid public use or public purpose. Under 
     91.  See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Cost of Compromise, n.Y. TimeS, July 10, 2013, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/the-cost-of-compromise.
     92.  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
     93.  Id.
     94.  New affirmative action cases have been filed for the fall term, including one from 
Michigan: Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for 
Equal. by Any Means Necessary v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
     95.  U.S. ConST. amend. XIV, § 1.
     96.  U.S. ConST. amend. V; U.S. ConST. amend. XIV, § 1.
     97.  See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Equal Protection from Eminent Domain: Protecting the 
Home of Olech’s Class of One, 55 loY. l. rev. 697 (2009).
     98.  U.S. ConST. amend. V.
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Berman,99 Midkiff,100 and Kelo,101 the Supreme Court has shown that plaintiffs have 
a formidable burden to prove that a public benefit is not likely to flow from the tak-
ing, but Hathcock might indicate a trend toward more scrutiny of states’ intentions 
and findings of economic benefit to flow from an eminent domain action.102
i. Due Process and Equal Protection Claims 
Many proposed solutions involve making due process or equal protection 
claims. However, the courts have never extended the protection of due process or 
equal protection to eminent domain challenges. The nature of these constitutional 
challenges is incompatible with an eminent domain challenge, both because they 
require a strict scrutiny analysis and because there is already an explicit textual 
remedy built into the Fifth Amendment.
The first problem with equal protection challenges is the Supreme Court’s 
application of strict scrutiny in equal protection cases.103 In order to satisfy strict 
scrutiny, the state must show that it had a compelling interest, and that its action was 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.104 In economic development takings cases, 
the state almost always has a compelling interest in improving blighted or danger-
ous urban areas, and the condemnation is a narrowly tailored mean.105 After Hath-
cock, states might be more restricted in plans that involve transfer of condemned 
land to a private entity, but so long as they put forth some plausible evidence that 
the plan will lead to some improvement in the area that could conceivably benefit 
the public, they will have satisfied the tailoring requirement.
Another problem facing both equal protection and due process claims is that 
the Fifth Amendment already provides a remedy for takings: just compensation. 
Albright v. Oliver held that “[w]here a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit 
textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government 
behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due 
process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’”106 In this case, the rem-
edy provided (just compensation) must be the guide for analyzing eminent domain 
challenges, and the Court should be reluctant to extend due process protection to 
eminent domain challengers when the Fifth Amendment already requires just com-
pensation as a remedy for an eminent domain taking. Plaintiffs in these cases are 
     
     99.  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
     100.  Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
     101.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
     102.  See Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
     103.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
     104.  Id.
     105.  See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
     106.  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386, 395 (1989)).
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already awarded just compensation as a remedy for the taking, so there is no reason 
they require the additional relief of monetary damages for a due process violation. 
Just compensation makes the plaintiff whole by compensating for the loss of the 
property, therefore awarding additional damages on top of compensation for the 
property would be an unfair windfall for the plaintiff.
ii. Public Purpose Challenges
The typical strategy for making a constitutional challenge to eminent do-
main takings is to argue that the taking does not serve a valid public purpose, as 
required by the Fifth Amendment. This was the theory relied on in all the major 
eminent domain cases.107 The problems facing these types of challenges are courts’ 
acceptance of the broad view of public use, and courts’ policy of extreme defer-
ence to legislatures in the exercise of eminent domain. As discussed above, courts 
have not interpreted the “public use” requirement so narrowly as to limit states to 
takings where the land will actually be held open to the public.108 Rather, they have 
accepted the more general “public purpose” requirement, which allows land taken 
by eminent domain to be transferred to private corporations and businesses, so long 
as the transfer serves the general purpose of improving the economic prosperity of 
the area.109 Even with the relative improvement anticipated under County of Wayne 
v. Hathcock,110 public use challenges are still unlikely to prevail unless the asserted 
benefit will truly only accrue to a private individual or corporation. Even if this pri-
vate benefit is empirically proven to be the likely outcome, courts are still hesitant 
to second-guess legislative findings because legislatures are far better equipped 
than courts to make such determinations.111
B. Statutory Limitations
Many other proposed solutions involve statutory limitations on state exer-
cise of the eminent domain power.112 However, there are several problems with this 
type of limitation: that they can only bind state, not federal, government; that they 
generally include an exception for blight; and that complete or partial bans on eco-
nomic development takings exclude the use of a very effective government tool for 
increasing land use efficiency and redeveloping cities for legitimate purposes that 
     107.  E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Poletown Neighborhood 
Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Ha-
thcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
     108.  Cohen, supra note 26, at 493–94.
     109.  See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.
     110.  684 N.W.2d 765.
     111.  See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
     112.  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 26; Imperatore, supra note 15.
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will provide a public benefit.
Complete and partial bans on economic development takings generally 
work by amending state constitutions or enacting new state laws. Many states al-
ready have such legislation in place, usually a partial ban with an exception for 
blight.113 Many argue for complete bans at the state level on any exercise of the emi-
nent domain power by a state for the purpose of economic development.114 How-
ever, these types of legislative enactments are only able to prevent takings by states 
and cities, while the federal government is free to condemn and take land based on 
its own findings of economic development or any other public purpose to be served.
Additionally, even at the state level complete or partial bans on economic 
development usually include an exception for blight.115 This exception renders ir-
relevant any limitation because states can justify condemnations by a showing that 
blight either currently exists or is likely to occur in the neighborhood in the future.116 
By merely offering evidence that a neighborhood is on its way to becoming a slum 
or that blight will occur, states are free to condemn private property and award it to 
private developers, meaning that any statutory limitation is essentially powerless.
Lastly, and most importantly for the purposes of this Note, attempting to de-
prive states of their eminent domain power for the purposes of economic develop-
ment places serious limitations on an incredibly effective tool that the Constitution 
gives to state and federal governments, consistent with American property law’s 
focus on efficiency.117 In cities like Detroit, where a shrinking population contin-
ues to create ever-larger abandoned urban areas and dangerously low population 
density,118 state and municipal governments can and should exercise their eminent 
domain power to consolidate and redistribute land to promote efficiency and avoid 
a dangerous political vacuum.
III. affIrmatIve actIon as tHe solutIon for tHe dIscrImInatory ImPact of 
economIc develoPment takIngs  
Two different types of affirmative action models were discussed in Section 
II of this Note. They will be analyzed separately as applied to the case of economic 
development takings in the City of Detroit, though in practice aspects of both models 
might be used in a unified plan for diversification. The diversity model is desirable 
     
     113.  See, for example, Michigan’s eminent domain compensation provision, miCh. ConST. 
art. X, § 2.
     114.  See Cohen, supra note 26.
     115.  Imperatore, supra note 15, at 1038–89.
     116.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 34.
     117.  For an economic efficiency analysis of property law, see riChard a. poSner, eCo-
nomiC analYSiS of laW ch. 3 (8th ed. 2011).
     118.  See also supra text accompanying notes 3–4.
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because the city has a long history of de facto segregation,119 yet because the dispar-
ity was not caused by the city, the city will not be permitted take affirmative steps 
to remedy it. The city may, however, determine that racial and ethnic diversity is a 
desirable quality in residential neighborhoods—and by default, in school systems—
and may then implement affirmative action programs designed to achieve diversity 
on all levels, provided that such programs do not consider race as the only factor in 
designing new models for housing projects.
Alternatively, if the city condemns certain neighborhoods and creates re-
location plans, the city may employ remedial affirmative action programs that are 
aimed at remedying the discriminatory impact of the city’s action in condemning 
primarily black neighborhoods. Such a program might involve preferential treat-
ment for minorities in relocating displaced residents and in designing new housing 
projects, or in qualifying for housing assistance. Due to the fact that the city itself 
will have knowingly taken discriminatory action in its exercise of eminent domain, 
this type of program has a better chance at surviving judicial scrutiny than the one 
in Richmond v. Croson for example,120 in which the city took action to remedy dis-
crimination by private actors.121 Here, the city will be remedying its own discrimi-
natory action of forcing primarily minority residents out of their homes in order to 
carry out urban development plans. 
Lastly, the city could avoid affirmative action altogether and instead imple-
ment social programs intended to improve racial integration and offer advantages 
to city residents in need, regardless of race. Given the racial makeup of the city, this 
type of program would in practice benefit black residents, but would be racially 
neutral in its description. This type of program would have an advantage in hold-
ing up against equal protection challenges, but a disadvantage in terms of taxpayer 
support, as its implementation and administration would probably require raising 
additional revenue in the city or county.
All three programs have their relative merits and weaknesses. Neverthe-
less, at least one of these programs or a combination of elements thereof should 
be enacted in the City of Detroit because its extreme segregation has long been a 
problem. Acting in the wake of large-scale condemnations and the municipal bank-
ruptcy filing,122 the city would be able to use a strategically advantageous time for 
the city to address this problem, because such condemnations would both neces-
sitate the need for alternative housing projects to accommodate displaced residents 
and mark a large step towards breathing new life into previously limited urban 
renewal efforts.
     119.  See also supra text accompanying notes 5–6.
     120.  488 U.S. 469 (1989)
     121.  Id. at 480.
     122.  See also supra text accompanying notes 1–2.
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A. Diversity Affirmative Action: Using the Public School Model
Attaining diversity is a permissible reason for implementing affirmative ac-
tion programs in public school systems.123 Though current case law on diversity 
affirmative action deals primarily with public schools and universities, there is no 
reason why such programs should not be extended to public housing or urban de-
velopment programs. If cities were able to show an effort to strive for racial diver-
sity without merely using race quotas, they could plan future developments in such 
a way that promotes racial integration in neighborhoods, such as building mixed-
income-level housing developments. 
One risk of this type of program is that the city might subject itself to an 
equal protection challenge for using socioeconomic status as a proxy for race in 
its attempt to achieve racial diversity.124 However, mixed-income-level housing is 
virtually a necessity in a city like Detroit, where the goal is to consolidate popula-
tion and dwellings, and therefore such arguments should not hold much weight. If 
the city goes forward with its plan to condemn underpopulated neighborhoods and 
increase population density by relocating residents in certain concentrated urban 
areas, any attempt at diversity affirmative action would likely be overshadowed by 
the more general urban development project. However, it is useful to discuss plans 
in terms of diversity affirmative action to open the possibility of addressing the 
segregation problem as well as the population problem. 
New downtown housing projects would likely attract some wealthy resi-
dents from the suburbs looking to live in a new, thriving downtown, but in its effort 
to attain racial and economic diversity the city should ensure that there are mixed-
income-level developments, and should take care to encourage minorities displaced 
by condemnations to occupy these new residences. Integrating housing will be more 
difficult than integrating public schools and universities, where the school may use 
its discretion in its admissions to create a diverse student body when a large group 
is vying for a limited number of spaces. However, because many residents will be 
displaced from their homes following the condemnations, the city can offer them 
opportunities to live in mixed neighborhoods, by promoting new housing develop-
ments or by offering aid in relocating to racially diverse neighborhoods. 
One way to increase diversity is to reserve some units in each building for 
low-income occupants, as was recently done in some of Chicago’s housing proj-
ects.125 The mixed-income strategy is the city’s attempt to “lure people of varying 
     123.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
     124.  See, for example, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in which the state disabil-
ity insurance system excluded pregnant individuals from coverage, and pregnant status became 
a proxy for gender. The Court found that the Equal Protection Clause was not violated, but the 
holding was superseded by the subsequent Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978, amending Title 
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2 (2006).
     125.  See, e.g., Will Doig, Chicago’s Housing Experiment, Salon (Sept. 1, 2012, 1:00 PM), 
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means into single developments.”126 If a city like Chicago, with its already large, 
well-settled population, is attempting to encourage economic integration through 
mixed-income housing projects, the effect of such a strategy could be even greater 
in a city like Detroit, where people will be relocating to densely populated urban 
centers when they are forced out of their low-occupancy neighborhoods. A certain 
level of scarcity could create the competitiveness needed to encourage people to vie 
for spots in such mixed-income housing projects, without allowing it to reach such 
an extreme level as compared to the 227,000 people who are on the waitlist for va-
cancies in New York City’s public housing projects.127 Fortunately, Detroit does not 
have the shortage of space that exists in New York City, but instead has space that 
can be put to good use to create more centralized housing in a new, smaller down-
town that will attract people of diverse racial and socioeconomic backgrounds.
Diversity in neighborhoods generally creates more stability in cities,128 and 
the City of Detroit should strive for diversity as it makes its own efforts to revi-
talize a depressed city. The past few decades should be enough evidence that the 
increasing segregation in the city is not the way to stability. Increasing diversity in 
order to improve living conditions and recreate a vibrant urban center is certainly 
a compelling interest that the city should strive to advance, and narrowly tailored, 
race-conscious measures may be the best means of achieving that end.
B. Remedial Affirmative Action
Because economic development takings have been shown to fall more 
heavily on minorities,129 the city could make a case for using remedial affirmative 
action in its relocation or redevelopment programs. In using such a program, the 
city would be remedying the discriminatory effects of its own action—its exercise 
of the eminent domain power—rather than the effects of a history of discrimination 
and segregation by society at large.
Though the greater evil to be remedied is the de facto segregation of the city 
and its metropolitan area, states may only take steps to remedy de jure, not de facto, 
segregation.130 Since the city itself did not create the segregation, it may not make 
race-based classifications in its attempt to remedy the type of segregation that exists 
today. Therefore, any remedial action must be directed toward the discriminatory 
impact of economic development takings that will occur during the downsizing 
http://www.salon.com/2012/09/01/chicagos_bold_experiment. 
     126.  Id.
     127.  See Mireya Navarro, On Public Housing Wait List, Position Unknown, n.Y. TimeS, 
July 23, 2013, at A1.
     128.  See, e.g., Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 BYU l. rev. 1175 (2009).
     129.  See Imperatore, supra note 15.
     130.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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project, not at the long-established racial division of the city.
C. Social Programs 
Despite the controversy surrounding affirmative action programs, they are 
appealing to the tax base at large because they focus costs in a way that other social 
programs do not.131 However, when condemnations are known to have a disparate 
impact on minorities, putting money into social programs that benefit minorities, 
it might be argued, is part of the just compensation required by this sort of taking. 
One type of social program that could be employed advantageously to rem-
edy the disparate effects of economic development takings is to replace condemned 
neighborhoods with mixed-income-level housing.132 This would promote diversity 
in urban areas and avoid the problem of replacing blighted areas with neighbor-
hoods likely to fall into blight again in the future. This strategy has been success-
fully employed in Paris, France and its suburbs, for example, where the French 
government has lowered property taxes in middle class neighborhoods where they 
introduced low-income housing projects.133 Neighborhoods that refuse the hous-
ing projects are subjected to higher taxes than those that allow the projects.134 This 
scheme has been a successful way to diversify both neighborhoods and school sys-
tems. Had they confined the affordable housing projects to separate, low-income 
neighborhoods, the French cities would have perpetuated the problem by creating 
further socioeconomic segregation, which plagues American urban centers such as 
Detroit.
This is similar to some proposals involving diversification in public housing 
initiatives,135 but it differs from other proposals in that it does not involve block-
ing discriminatory takings. Banning economic development takings in a place like 
Detroit would allow the dual problems of underpopulation and racial segregation to 
continue as before. Several neighborhoods are so low in population and so dilapi-
dated that the only remaining option is condemnation.136 
This is precisely the type of race and socioeconomic status conscious solu-
tion that should be applied in places like Detroit, where condemnations have been 
made necessary by blighted and under-populated neighborhoods that create the risk 
     
     131.  See Jarrod D. Reece, Note, Revisiting Class-Based Affirmative Action in Government 
Contracting, 88 WaSh. U. l. rev. 1309, 1321 (2011) (arguing that class-based affirmative 
action should be seen as a cost-saving measure to the state in its role as a social program pro-
vider).
     132.  Imperatore, supra note 15.
     133.  See, e.g., David le Blanc & Anne Laferrère, The Effect of Public Social Housing on 
Households’ Consumption in France, 10 J. hoUS. eCon. 429, 431 (2001).
     134.  Id.
     135.  See Imperatore, supra note 15.
     136.  MacDonald, supra note 7.
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of a political vacuum, and yet are likely to fall more heavily or exclusively on ra-
cial and socioeconomic minorities.137 It is difficult to see how a categorical ban on 
economic development takings would help in a situation such as this one, because 
the low population density and lack of upkeep are risk factors for increased crime 
and further decline.138 The city must be allowed to condemn such neighborhoods, 
but only while also addressing the burden on minorities. 
By using race-conscious measures in planning replacement housing to 
accommodate residents of the condemned neighborhoods, the city would not be 
merely remedying the burden on minorities, as in Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke,139 but could also take positive steps toward alleviating the flight and 
subsequent segregation that caused the disparity in the first place, as in the public 
schools cases.140
conclusIon
Though many have argued for banning economic development takings due 
to their disparate impact on minorities, the City of Detroit will need to use this tool 
to effectuate its prospective downsizing plans. An absolute ban would prevent an 
important effort to consolidate the city’s shrinking population into more densely 
populated urban areas, and leave the city with the sprawling, sparsely populated 
neighborhoods that make it up today. With the ability to condemn little-used neigh-
borhoods, and consciously and deliberately plan the building and resettlement of 
more centralized, concentrated neighborhoods, the city would have the addition-
al opportunity to remedy the longtime racial segregation of the city. Integrative 
housing plans could be formulated either as an attempt to diversify the population, 
or as a remedy for the disproportionate burden of the condemnations on minority 
residents. Either way, this would be a timely way for the city to address this long-
standing issue as it attempts to revitalize its downtown and regain its place among 
the important, diverse urban centers of America.
     137.  See Ben Beckman, Note, The Wholesale Decommissioning of Vacant Urban Neigh-
borhoods: Smart Decline, Public-Purpose Takings, and the Legality of Shrinking Cities, 58 
Clev. ST. l. rev. 387 (2010); Imperatore, supra note 15.
     138.  Beckman, supra note 137, at 395–96.
     139.  438 U.S. 265 (1978).
     140.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
201
   Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality                                 Volume 2, Issue 1
